The report China’s Industrial Strategy and the Stakes for Latin America, prepared by Margaret Myers for Alacero, examines how China built a system of state support that enables it to develop globally competitive industries with structural advantages that are difficult to replicate. The study warns that this model has direct implications for Latin America’s industrial development and its ability to build new production capacity.
China spends more than 5% of its GDP on industrial policy, equivalent to USD 939 billion in 2024. That amount represents nearly 13% of Latin America’s combined GDP, almost 50% of Mexico’s GDP, or 1.5 times Argentina’s GDP. By comparison, the European Union spends less than 1% of its GDP on industrial policy, while the OECD average is 2.5%.
China’s system combines subsidies, tax incentives, preferential lending, and state-backed investment funds known as Government Guidance Funds. These funds provide venture capital to help develop companies in sectors deemed strategic. Together, these instruments form a comprehensive industrial policy that supports companies at different stages of growth.
In the steel sector, China’s overcapacity is structural. The system keeps state-owned companies operating that would otherwise be unviable without public support. In 2024, 47 of the 48 steel producers listed in China’s CSMAR database received a combined USD 1.1 billion in subsidies, up 69% from 2020.
Meanwhile, steel exports are rising as profitability falls. In 2024, China exported a record 121 million tonnes in crude steel equivalent. That year, subsidies accounted for 4% of Chinese steel producers’ revenue, while their average net profit margin was −2.5%.
Latin America has become one of the main destinations for this surplus. China sees the region as a supplier of raw materials and a market for its manufactured goods. Against this backdrop, Chinese exports to Latin America have grown by 92% since 2020.
China’s strategy takes a long-term view. The country continues to support traditional industries such as steel while investing more heavily in high-tech sectors. To support the industries of the future, China established a new state fund of approximately USD 147 billion under its New Quality Productive Forces framework.
The 15th Five-Year Plan, covering 2026–2030, prioritizes the development of a “modern industrial system.” Domestic consumption ranks third, while steel falls under the “maintain and strengthen” category. The plan provides for production controls and export licensing for around 300 products starting in 2026. However, fiscal and political incentives at the provincial level keep steel mills operating.
This strategy also extends to electric mobility, batteries, semiconductors, biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing. These are among the areas in which Latin America is seeking to develop new production capabilities. The region’s industrial future could therefore be at risk if these sectors develop under deeply uneven competitive conditions.
The challenge for Latin America goes beyond trade defense. Without an industrial strategy of its own to address the imbalances created by Chinese state support, the region risks losing opportunities to industrialize before it can fully develop them. The response requires using trade policy tools while also addressing the structural imbalances created by China’s system of state support.
